Boston Lawyer Blog

Massachusetts Expands Ability to Prosecute Sex Offenses

Published on: September 4, 2026 | by Jackson Estrin

On July 24, 2026, Governor Maura Healey held a ceremonial signing for two new Massachusetts laws that seek to strengthen protections for survivors of sexual misconduct. Enacted through the fiscal year 2027 budget, the reforms address two distinct areas in Massachusetts law. One law creates an exception to the criminal statute of limitations when newly available DNA evidence identifies a suspect in a rape case. The other law makes certain sexual contact between adults in positions of authority and people under 18 non-consensual. Together, the laws expand prosecutors’ ability to pursue cases when they obtain forensic evidence and restrict certain defenses previously available to adults accused of sexual conduct involving minors under their supervision.

DNA Evidence and the 15-year Criminal Statute of Limitations

Under the new law rape prosecutions may proceed when DNA evidence identifies a suspect after the standard 15-year limitations period has expired. Massachusetts law generally bars prosecutions for the rape of an adult after 15 years. Although legislators have repeatedly sought to extend that limitations period, opponents, including defense attorneys, have argued that doing so could undermine the rights of the accused. To date, there have been limited exceptions to this statute of limitation. One existing exception is the tolling provision in G.L. c. 277, § 63, which excludes from the 15-year calculation any period during which the defendant was not “usually and publicly” a resident within Massachusetts. CONTINUE READING ›

Nine Zalkind Law Attorneys Named in 2027 Edition of Best Lawyers

Published on: August 20, 2026 | by Zalkind Duncan & Bernstein LLP

Zalkind Duncan & Bernstein LLP is proud to announce that the following attorneys are listed in the 2027 edition of Best Lawyers in America. Best Lawyers is the oldest and most respected peer-review publication in the legal profession and rates attorneys by conducting exhaustive peer-review surveys in which tens of thousands of leading lawyers confidentially evaluate their professional peers. Congratulations to all!

The Best Lawyers in America® 2027 Edition

Inga S. Bernstein – Criminal Defense: General Practice, Criminal Defense: White-Collar, Employment Law – Individuals, Litigation – Labor and Employment

Free Speech at College: What are Professors’ Rights?

Published on: August 18, 2026 | by Noah Gillen

In the past couple of years, college campuses have dealt with a range of free speech challenges that have become increasingly difficult to navigate amid a polarized political climate and heightened government scrutiny. As campus leaders and a vital bridge between students and the administration, college professors are uniquely positioned to cultivate free speech while helping to foster an inclusive campus environment. The challenge for professors, however, is determining how to exercise this influence while safeguarding their own academic freedom and careers. While the summer is in full swing and college campuses are still several weeks away from welcoming students back, it is never too early for college professors to refresh themselves on the basic boundaries and limitations of their own free speech rights.  

What rights do I have as a professor at a public college or university?

The First Amendment protects a wide range of speech and applies to many different forms of expression beyond just speaking and writing, including visual expression, such as art, theater, or messages depicted on clothing, and symbolic speech, such as burning a flag. The First Amendment does not protect all speech, though; there are narrow categories of unprotected speech which include obscenity, true threats, and the incitement of imminent lawless action.

Massachusetts Senate takes aim at addictive social media feeds, sidestepping House proposal to mandate age verification for all social media users

Published on: July 24, 2026 | by Jacob Bezner

Earlier this month, the Massachusetts State Senate passed a bill (S. 3175) designed to limit youth exposure to addictive social media feeds.

I previously discussed a bill approved by the Massachusetts State House that would ban all users under the age of fourteen from social media platforms and mandate all users—including adults—to verify with the platform that they are over the age of fourteen.

The Senate and House proposals are substantially different: the Senate proposal primarily regulates platforms by restricting the use of addictive features through an optional age verification scheme, and the House proposal regulates users by mandating age verification as a condition to use any platform.

MCAD issues new regulations dramatically reducing workers’ ability to fight employment discrimination

Published on: June 30, 2026 | by Naomi Shatz

On June 19, the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) decided to quietly roll back protections for workers, revising its regulations to make it harder for employees to fight discrimination in the workplace. These changes came after the MCAD recorded a record number of backlogged cases for fiscal year 2025 (investigations that have extended beyond 18 months). The new regulations seem aimed at allowing the MCAD to address this backlog not by finding ways to address its caseload more quickly, but by giving it broad power to decline to investigate claims of discrimination altogether.

What is the MCAD?

The MCAD is a state agency that is required by law to investigate complaints of discrimination in housing, in the workplace, in places of public accommodation, and in higher education admissions. Employees who experience discrimination are required to file their claims with the MCAD before they can bring those claims in court. The MCAD process moves through two stages: first there is an investigation that results in a decision that there either is probable cause to believe discrimination occurred (a finding for the employee) or there is not probable cause to believe discrimination occurred (a finding for the employer). In fiscal year 2025 the MCAD found for the employer 85% of the time at this stage. When there is a finding of probable cause, the case then moves to conciliation, where the MCAD tries to resolve the case with agreement by the parties. If conciliation is not successful the case moves to a public hearing, where the Commission hears the case and decides whether the employer violated the law and what remedies to impose.

A Superior Court Held that Colleges and Universities Must Protect Students from Harm. How Does This Help Students Who Are Suicidal?

Published on: June 18, 2026 | by Tess Halpern

In a 2021-2022 survey of students across 133 colleges and universities, 44% reported symptoms of depression, and 15% reported seriously considering suicide in the past year. Around that same time, experts estimated that approximately 1,100 college students died by suicide annually.

Unfortunately, at the same time in young adults’ lives when mental health struggles can appear and/or increase in severity, those young adults are often in college away from their homes and families. Additionally, as we have previously discussed, while colleges and universities have significant legal relationships with students, their duties with respect to students experiencing mental health issues have historically been limited by Massachusetts courts.

For example, in 2018, in Dzung Duy Nguyen v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) held that, “[w]here a university has actual knowledge of . . . a student’s stated plans or intentions to commit suicide, the university has a duty to take reasonable measures under the circumstances to protect the student from self-harm.” Yet, this decision does not impose any duty on a college or university that has more general knowledge of a student’s suicidality, such as knowledge of a student’s depression. In Nguyen, that line of reasoning resulted in the SJC holding that Massachusetts Institute of Technology had no duty to protect a student who died by suicide because that student “never communicated by words or actions to any MIT employee that he had stated plans or intentions to commit suicide.” Also relevant to this holding were the facts that Nguyen was a twenty-five-year-old graduate student living off campus rather than “a young student living in a campus dormitory under daily observation,” and that Nguyen repeatedly expressed that he wanted to keep his mental health struggles separate from his academic life.

Massachusetts Legislature mulls bill prohibiting student cell phone use in public schools and requiring age verification to use social media

Published on: May 22, 2026 | by Jacob Bezner

Last month, the Massachusetts State House passed a bill (H. 5366) that would have the Commonwealth join fifteen other states in banning cell phones in public schools statewide and twenty-seven other states in requiring all users—including adults—to verify their age to use social media.

Proponents of these policies argue that they are a step in the right direction in curbing compulsive cell phone and social media use among children and teens, which may have negative impacts on mental health and cognitive development.

On the other hand, the age verification component of the bill has faced criticism at both the state and national level, with opponents describing the age verification requirement as draconian and legal advocacy groups arguing that the requirement would violate the First Amendment.

Supreme Judicial Court confirms individuals may be sued for sexual harassment in education settings under state statute

Published on: May 21, 2026 | by Niamh Gibbons

In a decision issued this week, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) held that victims of sexual harassment in academic settings may sue individual harassers directly under G.L. c. 214, § 1C—the state’s sexual harassment statute. The ruling reverses a lower court decision that had dismissed a sexual harassment claim filed by Dr. Kristin Knouse against her former instructor, dissertation committee member, and fellowship director, Dr. David Sabatini. The new ruling clarifies that students and trainees have a statutory right to be free from sexual harassment during their education and may sue individual teachers, faculty, staff, or other students to enforce that right. Naomi Shatz and I filed an amicus brief in the case on behalf of Jane Doe Inc., the Victim Rights Law Center, the Women’s Bar Association of Massachusetts, and the Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association, urging the SJC to find that the statute allows for suits against individuals.

Background

The underlying dispute arose between Sabatini, a prominent biologist formerly at the Whitehead Institute and MIT, and Knouse, a former graduate student at MIT and later a Whitehead Fellow. Knouse alleged in internal reports to Whitehead that Sabatini engaged in sexualized comments while he was her instructor and a member of her dissertation committee, that they later had a sexual relationship while he had power over her career, and that Sabatini’s inappropriate conduct continued even after the relationship ended. An internal survey and independent investigation found that engaging in sexual discussions was a requirement for success in Sabatini’s lab and that the lab was dominated by a “culture of fear and retaliation.” When the independent investigation found violations of Whitehead’s sexual harassment policy, Sabatini separated from both Whitehead and MIT.

First Circuit Evaluates PIPs As Adverse Employment Actions

Published on: May 1, 2026 | by Jackson Estrin

To establish a viable claim of employment discrimination or retaliation, an employee must show, among other things, that they suffered an “adverse employment action.” While termination is a quintessential adverse action, less serious actions are also legally sufficient. In a recent decision in Walsh v. HNTB Corp., the First Circuit provided guidance as to when a performance improvement plan (“PIP”) may constitute an adverse employment action.

Background

In Walsh, the plaintiff, Joanne Walsh, worked as an information technology employee for HNTB Corporation in its Boston office for over 25 years. In 2019, when she was approximately 54 years old, she and another older employee in the same job were placed on nearly identical PIPs. During the course of the PIP, Walsh’s team leader told her that she could “be replaced with younger, cheaper people.” Walsh successfully completed the PIP but then felt that her working conditions deteriorated and she was treated differently than younger employees in the same job. Ten months after completing the PIP, Ms. Walsh and the other older employee who had been placed on the same PIP resigned. Ms. Walsh subsequently sued HNTB under both state and federal law, alleging that it had discriminated against her based on her age by placing her on a PIP and then constructively discharging her. The District Court found for HNTB on the discrimination claims, holding that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that Ms. Walsh’s PIP constituted an adverse employment action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) or M.G.L. c. 151B,. The District Court applied the same analysis to Ms. Walsh’s ADEA and 151B claims, noting that “the standards applied for age discrimination claims under federal law and Massachusetts state law are so similar that both claims can be analyzed together.” On March 13, 2026, the First Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling. In doing so, it provided important guidance on the proper adverse-employment-action standard and on when an employer-imposed PIP may satisfy that standard.

SJC protects low-wage earners’ ability to sue for unpaid wages

Published on: April 6, 2026 | by Noah Gillen

Last month, the Supreme Judicial Court issued a decision protecting the rights of low-wage workers to file lawsuits against their employer for unpaid wages. The decision concerned “anti-SLAPP” motions, which employees may file if, after they sue their employer, their employer countersues them solely to discourage the employee from proceeding with their original lawsuit. Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court clarified how judges are required to calculate attorney’s fees for successful appeals of anti-SLAPP claims by employees that are initially rejected by the trial court, and addressed whether judges can reduce an attorney’s fee award based on the amount of unpaid wages being sought.

Background

In Hidalgo v. Watch City Construction Corp., the plaintiff, Andres Hidalgo, who worked as a laborer, sued his employer for violations of the Massachusetts Wage Act and related claims. Mr. Hidalgo alleged that he had only been paid for two out of the six weeks he worked and sought $3,738.67 in lost wages. Due to the Wage Act’s treble damages provision, these unpaid wages would amount to $11,216.01 in damages. Watch City denied Mr. Hidalgo’s allegations and brought counterclaims for, among other things, malicious prosecution and abuse of process. Mr. Hidalgo brought a special motion to dismiss Watch City’s counterclaims under the anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that the claims were brought solely to discourage him from continuing with his lawsuit. After a judge denied Mr. Hidalgo’s motion to dismiss, the Massachusetts Appeals Court reversed the decision and ordered the dismissal of Watch City’s counterclaims.